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No. 20180016-CA  
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS  
__________________ 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MATTHEW GORDON EYRE 
Defendant/Appellant. 
 
Appellant is incarcerated. 
__________________ 
 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As required by rule 24(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this reply 
brief is “limited to responding to the facts and arguments raised in the appellee’s 
... principal brief.” Specifically, it responds to the State’s claim that Eyre failed to 
prove deficient performance. Eyre’s opening brief adequately addresses the 
State’s remaining arguments. This reply does not restate arguments from the 
opening brief or address matters that do not merit reply. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing 
to object to an instruction that incorrectly stated the elements of 
accomplice liability. 
Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object 
to an instruction that understated accomplice liability’s mens rea. To be guilty as 
an accomplice to aggravated robbery, Eyre needed to act “intentionally.”  That is, 
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he needed to act with the intent or desire to cause aggravated robbery. 
Instruction 40 omitted this critical requirement. Instead, the instruction 
suggested that the intentional mental state attached only to the actions of 
“solicited, requested, commanded, or encouraged, or intentionally aided.”  And 
the instructions as a whole did not cure this deficiency. 
The State disagrees, arguing that Eyre “has not proven deficient 
performance.” SB at p.25. It argues that “read together” the instructions 
adequately instructed the jury, contending that Eyre’s case is similar to State v. 
Augustine, 2013 UT App 61, and distinguishable from State v. Grunwald, 2018 
UT App 46. SB at pp. 20-25. Eyre addresses these claims.  
The State likens this case to Augustine, 2013 UT App 61, and State v. 
Clark, 2014 UT App 56. See SB at pp. 21-23. It argues that—as in those cases—the 
elements instruction on the underlying crime (aggravated robbery) along with the 
abstract statutory definition of accomplice liability adequately instructed the jury 
on accomplice liability’s mens rea.  The State is incorrect. 
Eyre distinguishes this case from Clark in the opening brief at pages 22-23.  
For the reasons asserted in opening, Clark is distinguishable from Eyre’s case. 
See OB at pp. 22-23. Augustine is similarly distinguishable.  
In Augustine this Court held that the instructions as a whole adequately 
instructed the jury on accomplice liability. 2013 UT App 61. In that case, it 
appears that only one instruction set forth the principles of accomplice liability. 
See id. ¶10. That instruction “quot[ed] the relevant statutory provision word-for-
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word.” Id. Then, in another instruction, the court outlined the elements of the 
underlying offense of murder. Id. This Court reasoned that “read[] . . . together,” 
the elements instruction and the statutory definition instruction “adequately 
explained” the mens rea required for accomplice liability. Id.   
  But unlike Eyre’s case, Augustine did not present a situation where the 
jury was given an incorrect instruction that conflicted with the statutory 
definition of accomplice liability. Compare id., with R.226-228; OB at pp. 16-23. 
As explained in opening, Eyre’s jury was not given a way to reconcile the 
statutory definition with Instruction 40, which—like the erroneous instruction in 
State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, ¶42—failed to connect a mens rea requirement to the 
underlying crime. See OB at pp. 21-23. Indeed, “[l]anguage that merely 
contradicts and does not explain a[n] [] infirm instruction will not suffice to 
absolve the infirmity.” Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 322 (1985); see also 
State v. Campos, 2013 UT App 213, ¶43 (finding error in a verdict form that 
“directly contradicted” a correct instruction on imperfect self-defense). Thus, 
unlike the instructions in Augustine, the conflicting instructions in this case 
failed to adequately instruct the jury on accomplice liability. 
 Additionally, the State attempts to distinguish this case from Jeffs and 
Grunwald, arguing that in those cases, “the accomplice liability instructions only 
included the erroneous accomplice liability elements instruction. Neither case 
included the additional accomplice liability statutes or definition instructions.” 
SB at p.25.  
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 Contrary to the State’s suggestion, the instructions given in Grunwald and 
Jeffs included an instruction setting forth the statutory definition of accomplice 
liability—much like the instruction given here. See Briefing (OB at pp. 50-54, SB 
at Addendum B), State v. Grunwald, Case No. 20160079-CA; Jury Instructions 
(No. 28), State v. Grunwald, Trial Ct. Case No. 141400517; Briefing (SB at 
Addendum B), State v. Jeffs, Case No. 20080408-SC; Jury Instructions (No. 14-
C), State v. Jeffs, Trial Ct. Case No.061500526.1 While the Grunwald and Jeffs 
courts did not mention the statutory definition instruction in their decisions, this 
Court may nevertheless take judicial notice that such an instruction was given in 
those cases. Specifically, this Court may take judicial notice of the jury 
instructions and appellate briefs filed in Grunwald and Jeffs, which demonstrate 
that the trial courts gave instructions setting forth the statutory definition of 
accomplice liability. See Briefing (OB at pp. 50-54, SB at Addendum B), State v. 
Grunwald, Case No. 20160079-CA; Jury Instructions (No. 28), State v. 
Grunwald, Trial Ct. Case No. 141400517; Briefing (SB at Addendum B), State v. 
Jeffs, Case No. 20080408-SC; Jury Instructions (No. 14-C), State v. Jeffs, Trial 
Ct. Case No. 061500526; Addendum A-B. 
An appellate court may consider evidence and allegations of which it takes 
judicial notice, even if it is not part of the appellate record. Green River Canal Co. 
v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, ¶31 n.8; see also Utah R. Evid. 201 (providing for judicial 
                                                 




notice of certain adjudicative facts). Judicial “notice may be taken of the record of 
another case,” including whether a filing has been made. Carter v. Carter, 563 
P.2d 177, 178 (Utah 1977); see also State v. Cooper, 2011 UT App 412, ¶15 n.8 
(suggesting that Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows courts “to take 
judicial notice of whether a filing has been made in another case”). “Likewise, a 
Court can take judicial notice that court filings contained certain allegations.” 
Cooper, 2011 UT App 412, ¶15 n.8 (quoting Federal Rules of Evidence Manual § 
201.02 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2010)). 
Furthermore, appellate courts may take judicial notice of public records. 
Thayn, 2003 UT 50, ¶31 n.8; Lehi Irr. Co. v. Jones, 202 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 
1949); McGarry v. Thompson, 201 P.2d 288, 291 (Utah 1948); see also BMBT, 
LLC v. Miller, 2014 UT App 64, ¶¶6-7 (holding that the trial court could take 
judicial notice of “the Note as a public record”). In Utah, court records are 
presumptively public records. Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 4-202.02(1). Moreover, 
“[p]ublic court records include but are not limited to … appellate filings, 
including briefs.” Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 4-202.02(2)(C). 
Here, it follows that this Court may take judicial notice of the appellate 
briefs in Grunwald and Jeffs, which contemplate that the trial courts gave the 
statutory definition of accomplice liability. See Briefing (OB at pp. 50-54, SB at 
Addendum B), State v. Grunwald, Case No. 20160079-CA; Briefing (SB at 
Addendum B), State v. Jeffs, Case No. 20080408-SC. It may also take judicial 
notice of the Grunwald and Jeffs jury instructions, which constitute court filings 
and public records. See Jury Instructions (No. 28), State v. Grunwald, Trial Ct. 
Case No. 141400517; Jury Instructions (No. 14-C), State v. Jeffs, Trial Ct. Case 
No. 061500526; Addendum A-B; see also Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 4-
202.02(2)(C); EMBT, LLC, 2014 UT App 64, ~,i6-7; 2011 UT App 412, ~15 n.8; 
Thayn, 2003 UT 50, ~31 n.8; Carter, 563 P.2d at 178; Cooper; Lehi Irr. Co., 202 
P.2d at 895; McGarry, 201 P.2d at 291. 
The Grunwald and Jeffs briefs and instructions demonstrate that the 
statutory definition of accomplice liability was given to the juries in those cases. 
Thus, as in Grunwald and Jeffs, the statutory definition-combined with the 
incorrect elements instruction (Instruction 40)-failed to adequately instruct 
Eyre's jury. And as discussed in opening, counsel performed deficiently by failing 
to object to erroneous instructions on accomplice liability. Grunwald, 2018 UT 
App 46, ~42; see also OB at pp.16-25. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons here and in opening, Eyre asks this Court to reverse his 
aggravated robbery conviction and remand for a new trial. 
+n 
SUBMITTED this / 5 day of January 2019. 
AL DRAS. McC.i~,~ 
Att rney for Defendant/ Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, I AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COU TY, STATE OF UTAH 
TATE OF UTAH , 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WARREN STEED JEFFS , 
Defendant. 








) · Case No . 061500526 
) 
) 
These jury inscruccions are given to assist you in your deliberations in this case. The order 
in which these instructions are given has no significance as to their relative importance, and you 
should not single out any one and ignore the rest. Consider the instructions as a whole . 
These instructions are intended to be applicable to eiU1er gender. Any use of the male 
pronouns (he, him , his) should be read to include the appropriate female pronoun if needed. 
2. ROLE OF JUDGE A D JURY 
This i a criminal trial. In every criminal trial there is a disagreement about whether 
someone has committed a crime. You must decide that question in the case . 
My duty as judge requires me to instruct you concerning the law which applies to this case. 
lt is your duty as jurors to follow the law as I shall state it to you. 
Your function is to decide the issues of fact presented by the charges in the Information and 
the defendant's plea of "not guilty " thereto. · You should not be influenced by pity for the 
defendant or by prejudice against the defendant. The fac t that an Information has been filed or that 
the defendant has been brought before the court to stand trial cannot be considered by you as any 
evidence of guilt. 
You are to be governed only by the evidence introduced in this trial and rhe law as I state 
it w you : You are expected to act conscientiously and calmly in weigh ing the ev idence and 
applying the law applicable to this case to reach a just verdict, regardless of what the consequences 
of the verdict may be. 
I I c:y::J 
INSTRUCTIO NO. /ll- ~ 
CRIMI AL RESPO SIBILJTY FOR CO DUCT Of' ANOTHER 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of rape 
who directly commits the rape, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intenLionally aids another person to engage in sexual intercourse without consent shall be 
c1iminally liable as a party for the rape. 
/lo'/ 
ADDENDUM B
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
MEAGAN DAKOTA GRUNW ALO, 
Defendant. 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Case Number: 141400517 
Judge Darold J. McDade 
INSTRUCTION NO. I 
You have two main duties as jurors. 
FILED 
MAY O 7 2015 
4TH Ol~TRJCT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
The first is to decide from the evidence what the facts are. Deciding what the facts are is 
your job, not mine. 
The second duty is to take the law I give you in the instructions, apply it to the facts, and 
decide if the prosecution has proved the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
You are bound by your oath to follow the instructions that I give you, even if you 
personally disagree with them . This includes the instructions I gave you before trial, any 
instructions I may have given you during the trial , and these instructions. All the instructions are 
important, and you should consider them as a whole. The order in which the instructions are 
1606 
INSTRUCTION NO. 28 
A person can commit a crime as a "party." Under Utah law, every person, acting with the 
mental state required for the commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in 
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct as if 
that person was the actual actor. 
In other words, a person can commit a criminal offense even though that person did not 
personally do any or all of the acts that make up the offense. If you find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that 1) the defendant had the mental state required to commit an offense, and 2) the 
defendant solicited, requested, encouraged, or intentionally aided another to commit an offense, 
and 3) the offense was committed, then you can find the defendant guilty of that offense. 
The defendant is charged as a "party" in a number of the counts in this case. 
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